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Summary  findings
Institutions we know as central banks emerged or were  ascendant and intervention  is falling out of favor - the
established as commercial banks or government banks.  pendulum has swung again.
Their evolution into central banks came with their  Economies in transition confront high inflation and
monopoly issuing notes and their role as lender of last  the problem of maintaining monetary stability just as
resort, among other functions. Carrying out commercial  newly independent developing countries did in the
business on a large scale created a conflict of interest, so  1960s. How can inflation be controlied? Under fiat
this practice was abandoned. Depending on government  regimes, the money supply is controlled by the domestic
also hindered maximum performance.  monetary authority. But can they control  monetary
Establishing the right degree of dependence was  growth? Prior and current records are not encouraging.
difficult, and changed in times of crisis. Independence is  Even if authorities have good intentions, will they be
important: it helps to establish reputation, which is  believed? Credibility, so essential to success, does not
everything in banking. Independence can't be established  cotne easily.
overnight and is liable to abrupt alteration. The Great  Options include maintaining a fixed exchange rate or
Depression, widely attributed to inept Central Bank  reviving currency boards. Currency boards function like
behavior, interrupted  central bank independence, but  an independent central bank, holding reserves and tying
poor price behavior brought about its return.  In the  domestic currency to strong foreign currency. Such
nineteenth century, laissez faire and the gold standard  arrangements have succeeded, but most operated  when
encouraged and sometimes allowed for considerable  sterling was strong. And most countries with currency
independence. After the end of the "intermission of  boards conducted most of their trade with Britain, at
mercantilism," which arrived with World War 1,  least in sterling.
preferences changed. Crisis provoked intervention. But  There  are drawbacks to currency boards, especially for
wartime inflation and the return of peace allowed  countries in transition. They require a considerable
independence to return briefly. Greater changes came in  sacrifice of sovereignty, and are unlikely to appeal to
the new dirigiste environment following the Great  countries that are only beginning to recover lost
Depression and the rise of the managed economy. In the  sovereignty.
current  climate - in which market solutions are
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DiscussionDifferent types of economists have different opinions about establishing, reforming, and reshaping
central banks. Mainstream economists would first think of questions of time consistency and the trade
off between inflation and unemployment in the short and long run. More quantitative economists  vould
first construct an index of independence-one  of these exercises in specific accuracy that Morgenstem
warned against about forty years ago. Economic  journalists  in Eastern Europe would be inclined to see
the Mastricht treaty as the model for the kind of reforn  that should take place in the European
community-or  at least the source of discussion on the need for reform. Economists with a more
political bent would talk about the need for central banks in a democracy if the banking system is to
operate effectively. And some would emphasize the importance of leadership or stress the approach to
change-dramatic  or gradual--that  should be taken to reflect the broad consensus of views. Economists
with a historical bent would think immediately of longer-term factors and of the circumstances in which
institutions might be or have been effective. All of these approaches are useful, but this paper emphasizes
the importance of history.
Although we are guided by historical lessons and experience, lessons from history present
problems. One distinguished British historian claimed that the only lesson to be learned from history is
that history has no lessons. More useful, but still short of what is required today, is the view that history
teaches us to act witlh  skepticism or at least caution. But historians are always being asked for a more
precise lesson. This request produces a tension among some historians. The historian within the
economic historian is content to explain events in terms of the specific factors that caused them at a
Iparticular time. But the economist within the economic historian is always pulled toward generalization,
looking for patterns. This temptation is understandable temptation, and although it may be dangerous, it
is being succumbed to here.I
The major obstacle to the successful transition to a market economy is inflation. In periods of
uncertainty and difficulty the likelihood of political interference in money growth arises, which could
exacerbate inflation. And inflation must be prevented. In other words, reform must lead to central
banking independence. At least that's where transition begins.
This paper first defines central banks, how they came into being, and how they functioned. It
then comments on how central banks have operated historically and how they should operate today.
After determining when they first appeared in their modern form, the questions of why they are needed
and what they require in order to perform well are addressed. Consideration of their historical
development reveals the kind of tensions that have arisen given the conflicting objectives that central
banks have faced.
Inflation Control
For developing or transition economies the need to reform the monetary sector derives from the danger
of inflation, particularly great if the expected upheaval from transition is large. An examination of the
incidence of serious inflation (inflation in excess of 100  percent per year) prior to 1950 reveals some
striking features. First, there were remarkably few episodes, and most took place in the twentieth
century. Second, they were all a result of monetary expansion necessitated by budget deficits. In most
'.The  good economic historian combines an alertness for the contingent with an eye on the systematic.
But there is also the dictum to bear in mind, that while good history may do a little good, bad history can
do a lot of harm. Keeping this in mind, I will say something about the emergence and performance of
central banks and suggest policies that might be advocated at the present time.
2cases the principle caLise  was great economic stress: the potential for civil disorder was real because the
government was wveak,  opposil1g forces stronger than itself. On occasion these forces were civil wars or
revolutions. The explanation behind rapid inflation is straightforward. Serious social disorder provokes
large-scale spending by the government in an attempt to placate or suppress the rebellious groups.
When this kind of tension exists, public revenue falls as the disaffected section withdraws its
support. The need for extra support and the shrinking of the tax base forces the government to print
money to cover the budget deficit-it  relies on an inflation tax. As Keynes put it in 1923, inflation is the
form of taxation that the public finds hardest to evade, and even the weakest government can enforce it
when it can enforce nothing else.
This evidence would suggest that the proliferation of rapid inflation after 1950 would have a
similar explanation. And indeed a casual examination of the worst cases of inflation between 1950 and
1990 confirm that this stress is a common experience. Recent episodes provide further confirmation, with
the worst examples coming from some parts of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.
Inflation arises not simply because of monetary expansion but because of an unsustainable fiscal
position. In fiat monetary regimes, which have characterized most countries for the last quarter century,
the only backing for currency is the government's commitment to a sustainable fiscal position: the stream
of income from taxation is sufficient to cover proposed expenditure. In countries in transition such a
commitment is difficult to provide. Furthermore, in many of the countries that we examine here, price
deregulation has meant that cash flow to the central government has been cut, especially from state-
operated enterprises. With few, if any, alternate sources of tax revenue and a debt market in its infancy,
budget deficits widen and the danger of monetization and inflation arises. Some countries, such as
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have been able to cope with this stress quite well, but others will
not.
3It is this danger of inflation appearing or worsening that produces the need for monetary reform.
In many of the countries that we discuss, these kinds of tensions reign, whicih  are undoubtedly going to
prodLIce  a threat of serious inflation.
A properly funlctioning  market economy needs a stable national currency. Regardless of how the
currenicy  xvas  stabilized, it was in place before economic growth occurred in all modern industrial
countries. Reforming countries, particularly those with command economies, must establish a proper
legal framework that includes a comprehensive co,nmercial code covering the operation of the monetary
sector. In particular, the code must specify the provision of the currency and therefore involve the central
bank. But althoughi  the case for independence is powerful, it could have some weaknesses. It seems to
me that this is a lesson that historians learn: when everybody joins the bandwagon, it may be time to
reassess the logic of the bandwagon.
The Development of Central Banks
The starting point for a central bank is a banking system that is already in place-the  banking system
necessitates the central bank. I argue that the central bank, with very few exceptions, most notably the
Bank of England, is essentially a twentieth century phenomenon and emerged in order to deal with actual
or potential problems in the banking system. The Bank of England was established in 1694, but at that
time there was no concept of central banking. Something close to that conception had emerged by the
end of the century, and Henry Thornton probably regarded the Bank of England as a nascent central bank
in the modem sense, albeit recognizing many of its deficiencies.
But some prefer to date its beginning from the time that monopoly rights of issue were
established. Still others require that it have the role as the lender of last resort (and be divested of
commercial interests). If we accept that all of these conditions are needed then most European central
4banks of the nineteenth century were not central banks. They became central banks onily  in the twentieth
century. By the beginning of the twentieth century there were eighteen central banks. Thereafter, the
concept was so thoroughly accepted and the institutions so widely desired that many independent
countries established their own central banks. By 1950 there were fifty-nine, 161 by 1990, and the
number has risen subsequently.
Central Bank Operations
What is it that central banks do? Their operation can be reduced to their macroeconomic function and
their microeconomic function. The macroeconomic function is to preserve the value of the currencv, that
is, maintain price stability. The microeconomic function is to maintain stability in the banking system.
The maintenance of price stability has almost always been achieved with the same instrument: the central
bank's discount rate. When the gold standard was used, the value of central bank notes was expressed in
terms of their metal (usually gold) content, which the central banks attempted to maintain at stated levels
over time.
The gradual replacement of the gold standard with pure fiat standards in the twentieth century
recast the objective of central bank policy as maintaining price stability. Comparisons between the gold
standard, classical gold standard theories, and subsequent monetary regimes showed that while none
fully stabilized prices, the gold standard outperformed the others in this respect.
Central banks are also needed because of the unique nature of the banking business. Banks hold
deposits that are redeemable for money on a first-come, first-serve basis. In a fractional reserve banking
system there can never be a run on deposits, which could produce a collapse in the money stock. To
prevent a run the bank assets should be marked to market. But it is impossible, because of the nature of
5the assets, to mark them to market. Thus central banks, the provider of the ultimate means of settlement,
are essential for maintaining the stability of the financial system.
Throughout the history of central banking there has been tension between their function of
maintaining the value of the currency and their function as bankers to the government. Central banks
have almost invariably been established by legislative charter and have been designated as bankers to the
government. Governments have a natural preference for cheap finance from their own bank, particularly
whien  there is a threat such as war. The government has both the power and the incentive to force the
central bank to give priority to their immediate needs. Another tension arises in functioning as the lender
of last resort, which may necessitate seeking agreement or help from the government.
Lender of Last Resort
The role of lender of last resort is at the core of the discussion of central banking. The issue is much
discussed, but a lot of the discussion has either been at cross purposes or there is disagreement over how
the role should be defined. Usually, the definition comes down to rescuing individual banks or providing
liquidity for the market as a whole.
The difficulty in defining this role can be illustrated as follows. Any commercial bank may
extend additional loans to clients who are temporarily illiquid or, possibly, insolvent. They may do so
even when the expected return from the new loan is zero or negative, if the wider effects-for  example,
on their reputation for commitment to clients-or  the "knock-on" effects of the failure of the first client
on a customer justify this action. In the same way a nascent central bank may rescue some client or
correspondent bank, just as a commercial bank supports its business customer. But we would not want to
include such occasional, ad hoc exercises as duties of the lender of last resort. If we did, then we would
have to date the Bank of England's activity to the early eighteenthi  century. On the other hand, a central
6bank would not want to precommit to supporting a bank that was having liquidity problems. Given the
development of efficient interbank and other short-term money markets, liquidity problems, if not caused
by a technical problem, likely reveal a deeper problem with the bank's solvency. Consequently, an
unqualified precommitment to provide assistance would generate the problem of moral hazard.
In my view the central bank fulfills the role of lender of last resort when it accepts responsibility
for the stability of the banking system, which overrides any residual concern with private profitability.
Thus it is the rationale for providing such support, rather than the acts themselves that determine w hether
the central bank has in fact become a lender of last resort.
Of course, shiifts in perception are hard to date. The Bank of England's court remained divided
over this issue at least until the publication of Bagehot's Lombard Street in 1873. And we have less
insigilt into the transformation in other countries that have institutions founded at early dates. But we can
say for sure that by about 1900 the role was widely accepted as a core function.
A similar problem arises wheni  we turn to open market operations. The early, large commercial
b'anks  could extend or reduce their own loans and discounts and thus influence markets rates of interest
or external gold flows. And they occasionally used their power to these ends. Nevertheless, this behavior
did not necessarily show that bankers had a full understanding and command of open market operations.
As the commercial banks in England increased in size relative to the size of the central bank, the central
bank found that the market diverged from bank rates, and they worried about how to make bank rates
effective 2
2  Sayers (1936) shows how the Bank of England developed an understanding over a long period of how
to use its open market operations.
7Because at that time the central bank had a crucial interest in and indeed an overriding objective
of ensuring financial stability, it would rescue the system as lender of last resort. Serving this function
frequently leads to the cessation of commercial rivalry and the possibility of the need to supervise,
monitor, and regulate the system. In order for a central bank to act with the necessary detachment and
objectivity, it should not conduct commercial activity on a scale that would force it to compete with
commercial banks. As Goodhart (1988) put it, the metamorphosis from their operation as one of many
competitive profit maximizing banks to a noncompetitive, non-profit  maximizing institution marked the
true emergence of the central bank. Before 1900, most European central banks failed this test.
Regulation and supervision are the key microeconomic functions of central banks, acting as
lenders of last resort. These regulations have almost always, perhaps always, arisen because of practice.
They were frequently in place before the last resort function and are seen by some as the cause of some
crises. Furthermore, because of crises, regulations are usually devised in a hurry, and are thus worse than
they might have been if they had been more carefully considered.
An Independent Institution
How can these institutions meet their goals? Central bank independence is an advantage. What is
independence? I define it as the right to change the operating variable without a challenge from or a
consultation with government. With this definition, or any other, it is still difficult to judge the degree of
independence from central bank statutes. In any event these statutes were modified frequently. Hence
skepticism regarding estimated dates of independence is warranted. When the Bank of England was a
private institution in the nineteenth century, it was entirely independent by any formal criteria. But Fetter
shows that this independence was a fiction because the connections between the government and the
bank were very strong.
8Also,  the question  of the operating  variable  is seldom  dealt with in the statutes.  And even if such
a policy was stated  explicitly,  it may not necessarily  prevail.  Thus the characterization  of banks requires
a fairly intimate  knowledge  of their structure,  organization,  and working  practices  as well  as the
personalities  in both the bank and government.
Several  studies have  examined  the relationship  between  central  bank independence  and inflation.
Using  data from 1973  to the present--a period  of floating  exchange  rates-they  found  a close
correspondence  between  independence  and good  price performance.  A colleague  and I ran the test for
1890  to 1990,  during which  there were several  periods  of floating  rates and therefore  much  more
monetary  independence.  Our findings  confirmed  the earlier  results.
The Nature of Central Bank Independence
Institutions  that were founded  before  the nineteenth  century,  but were not yet central banks,  were
acquiring  central bank functions  in the nineteenth  century  and beginning  to behave like modem central
banks.  Chief  among  these functions  was  the responsibility  for maintaining  currency  convertibility  under
the gold standard.
In the nineteenth  century  the philosophy  of laissez  faire dominated,  and central  banks enjoyed
greater latitude  compared  with earlier  (and later)  times. World  War I brought  that freedom  to an abrupt
end. After the war there was a desire  to return  to prewar  status, but movement  toward  this end was
precluded  by the Great  Depression,  World  War 11,  and then permanently  by the rise of the managed
economy.  Only in recent years has the trend  begun to reverse.
By around 1800  the Bank of England  dominated  the monetary  system  and held the reserves  of
the system.  Also, there are examples  of the Bank  rescuing  the market  and individual  banks.  Freed from
the obligation  of converting  its notes after 1797,  the Bank  was accused  of being  responsible  for the
9falling exchange rate. It rejected the idea that it had the power to influence the price level or that it had
public responsibility. But  the bank was clearly beginning to develop into something other than a private
institution. It had many characteristics of a modern central bank and its behavior was encouraged by
people like Henry Thornton. But even in nineteenth century England the situation was far from
straightforward. The 1844 act may have helped, but the exact nature of the relationship between the Bank
and government continued to be debated. In the financial crises of -1847, 1857, and 1866 the Bank turned
to the government to intervene, in effect to allow it to break the law and suspend convertibility.
Independence was not widespread in this age of economic liberalism. For example, even the
Bank of France, wvhich  claimed to have a considerable degree of autonomy, was subject to many controls
from the early 1800s until the mid-  1800s. The Ministry of Finance exercised considerable power.
Nevertheless, there was a large degree of independence in the operation of monetary policy in France and
in some other countries in the middle of the nineteenth century.
Central European experience was somewhat different because the age of economic liberalism
arrived much later and didn't have a great deal of time to flourish before the end of the nineteenth
century. lntervention had always been more popular in Central Europe. The story that has always been
told about continental Europe derives in part from the work of Gershenkron (1965). He held that because
Central European countries had industrialized relatively late and in varying degrees relative to Britain,
they were forced to take actions that were not needed in Britain, which gave rise to the universal bank
and the greater role of the state: the less developed the country, the greater was the need for intervention.
This thesis has been challenged in recent years, particularly with respect to the contribution that
universal banks have made. But it is still a useful explanation for the extended intervention. Thus these
central banks, or the institutions that became central banks, had a considerable degree of independence
when they were established and throughout the nineteenth century.
10But when the gold standard was abandoned at the outbreak World War 1, the government sought
greater control of resources, and prices soared almost everywhere. The relationship between the state and
central banks was then sharply defined: at times of intense crisis the state enforced its authority. World
War I was a stern test of bank independence. But the war proved too stressful, and independence was
abandoned. The Federal Reserve, established just before the war as an independent institution, lost its
independence immediately after the United States joined the war.
After the war there was a widespread desire to return the central bank to its prewar role.
Furthermore, the high inflation experienced after the war generated widespread acceptance of the
dangers inherent in political interference and an equally widespread desire to make central banks
independent. At the Brussels conference in 1920 a resolution was passed stating that banks, especially
banks of issue, should be free from political pressure and should be run solely on the basis of prudent
finance. The years leading to the Great Depression were in fact characterized by a pursuit of
independence.
Independence was a powerful feature of the reconstruction scheme of the League of Nations and
was also found in Latin America. The Bank of England recaptured its independent status after World
War 1, but after the Depression the government had a greater desire to influence interest rates. It is still
difficult to disentangle the issue for the Bank of England, as it is for other central banks.
At the end of the interwar period Plumbtree wrote "one of the primary tenets of accepted central
banking thought has been the importance of keeping central banks politically independent." But that
view began to weaken. Many countries regarded the Great Depression (1929-33) as a consequence of
central and commercial bank failure. Reform was thought to be urgently needed, an important aspect
being the removal of independence. Plumbtree's view became obsolete by the middle of the 1930s, as
confidence in liberal capitalism weakened.
11Three factors  were responsible  for the loss of confidence:  the worldwide  drift toward socialism
and intervention,  the rise of Keynesian  economics  and economic  management,  and World  War II'and its
aftermath.  Governments  were encouraged  to again adopt  interventionist  policies.  Many  central  banks
were nationalized.  Further,  the extension  of national  political  independence  and the birth of new states  in
the 1940s,  1950s,  and 1960s  resulted in the emergence  of governments  that sought  control  over their own
affairs.
Governments  established  central  banks  or took over or converted  existing institutions  such as
currency  boards.  Thus from  just prior to World  War II until around 1970  central  banking  grew widely,
and the relationship  between  government  and central  banks  was one of relative  closeness  and
dependence,  unlike  the interwar  years and most  of the nineteenth  century.
The inflationary  experience  of the late 1960s  to the late 1980s--during  which  the world,  for the
first time, experienced  a generally  peaceful  period-caused by a flat money  regime,  again made clear the
relationship  between  expansionary  monetary  policy  and inflation.  The view developed  that if central
banks  were less susceptible  to government  pressure,  they  would maintain  lower  inflation.  The desire for
more independence  reemerged,  and now  that desire  is being  put into practice.
Concluding Thoughts
What  have we learned  about  central banks?  The principle  factors  influencing  autonomy  in the past two
centuries  have been prevailing  political  conditions,  laissez  faire,  and the exchange  rate regime (fixed  or
floating).  In the nineteenth  century laissez  faire  and the gold standard  encouraged  and sometimes
allowed  for a considerable  amount  of independence.  After  what Jacob Viner  called the end of the
intermission  of mercantilism,  which arrived  with World  War 1,  preferences  changed.  Crisis provoked
government  intervention.  But the wartime  inflation  and the return  to peace allowed  independence  to
12make a brief return. Greater changes came in the new dirigiste environment following the Great
Depression and the rise of the managed economy. In the current climate, in whicih  market solutions are
ascendant and intervention is falling out of favor, the pendulum has swung again.
Where does this history lead us in terms of advising economies in transition? These economies
are confronted with high inflation and the problem of maintaining monetary stability just as newly
independent developing countries were in the 1960s. How can inflation be controlled? Under fiat regimes
the money supply is controlled by the domestic monetary authority. But can they control monetary
growth? Prior and current records are not very encouraging. But even if the authorities have good
intenitions,  will they be believed? An essential element to the process-credibility--cannot  be achieved
easily.
There are several possible solutions, such as maintaining a fixed exchange rate. A prominent
suggestion is to revive currency boards. Currency boards act like an independent central bank. Domestic
currency is tied to strong foreign currenicy  and all reserves are held. Historically, these arrangements
have been very successful, although the vast majority operated in a period when the sterling was strong.
Further, most of the countries witlh  currency boards conducted most of their trade with Britain, or at least
in sterling. It may be the case that these particular features allowed for successful functioning.
Of course, there are drawbacks to currency boards, particularly for countries in transition.
Currency boards require a considerable sacrifice of sovereignty. It is therefore unlikely to appeal to
countries that are only beginning to recover lost sovereignty.
What have we learned from the historical experience of central banking? Institutions that we
know as central banks emerged or were established as commercial banks or govemment banks. Their
evolution into central banks came with their monopoly over note issue and their role as lender of last
resort, among other functions. There was a conflict of interest as long as they carried out commercial
13business on a large scale-this  practice was thus abandoned. Dependence on government was also an
obstacle to achieving best performance. But establishing the optimal degree of dependence was difficult,
and it changed sharply in times of crisis.
Independence is important. Among other things it helps to establish reputation, which is
everything in banking. And, by definition, it can't be established or acquired overnight. Historical
experience shows that independence is liable to abrupt alteration. Invariably, it was a crisis that caused  it
to disappear-often  the outbreak of a war. The Great Depression, widely attributed to inept central bank
behavior, was another cause. On the other hand, poor price performance brought about its return. So,
although I would like to think that we have discovered something about central  banks and the benefits of
autonomy, the circumstances guiding its adoption are, to say the least, open to discussion.
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